A companion piece to the case for foundational reform of US biosecurity and biosafety governance, developed further in the CSPO talk.
A four-year Harvard project on integrating ethical, legal, and social engagement into early-stage technological research, which provided a model for changing practice, policy, and pedagogy that extends to other innovation centers.
It’s really hard to talk about the actual practice of biorisk management. After brainstorming about this at a 2018 NTI workshop in London with Megan Palmer (Stanford) and Stella Hurley (Science), NTI…
It is a time for a change in the way we understand the relationship between science, security, and society. In my recent piece in Issues in Science and Technology, I argue that we need systemic…
The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching…
Less than a year after the first published paper on CRISPR-CAS9 gene drives, an undergraduate team in the international Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM) competition were trying to create one…
This report documents the discussions of the 2017 Stakeholder Engagement Workshop on the Implementation of the United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use…
Biological science and its applications are rapidly evolving, and to keep up with emerging security concerns, governance of biosecurity applications should evolve as well. In a Policy Forum…
A public comment to the Department of Commerce ANPRM on defining emerging technologies for export control, with 13 recommendations on how ETTAC and the interagency process should approach the task.
Ten years spent circling the concept of dual-use: why biosecurity governance leans so heavily on a duality between legitimate and illegitimate use, read through Foucault’s analysis of othering and power.